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After inhalational anthrax was diagnosed in a Connecticut woman on November 20, 2001, postexposure
prophylaxis was recommended for postal workers at the regional mail facility serving the patient’s area.
Although environmental testing at the facility yielded negative results, subsequent testing confirmed the
presence of Bacillus anthracis. We distributed questionnaires to 100 randomly selected postal workers
within 20 days of initial prophylaxis. Ninety-four workers obtained antibiotics, 68 of whom started postexpo-
sure prophylaxis, and of these, 21 discontinued. Postal workers who never started or stopped taking pro-
phylaxis cited as reasons disbelief regarding anthrax exposure, problems with adverse events, and initial
reports of negative cultures. Postal workers with adverse events reported predominant symptoms of gas-
trointestinal distress and headache. The influence of these concerns on adherence suggests that commu-
nication about risks of acquiring anthrax, education about adverse events, and careful management of
adverse events are essential elements in increasing adherence.
n November 20, 2001, Bacillus anthracis was confirmed
in blood cultures from a 94-year-old woman in rural
Oxford, Connecticut, who was diagnosed with inhalational
anthrax and died 1 day later (1,2). No obvious source of expo-
sure to B. anthracis was identified. She was the 22nd patient
diagnosed with anthrax in the United States in 2001 (3).
Before this case, all patients diagnosed with inhalational
anthrax had had contact with intentionally contaminated mail
delivered through the postal system, with the exception of a
patient in New York City (where an investigation was under
way). Since the source of transmission was identified as the
mail for all but one anthrax case, investigation of area postal
facilities began immediately.
The mail was considered a likely source of contamination
for the patient in Connecticut, and postexposure antimicrobial
prophylaxis was recommended for postal workers employed in
the regional distribution center and local post office serving
the patient’s area. At the regional postal distribution center,
which operates 24 h a day and employs 1,122 workers,
employees work one of three 8-h shifts and process approxi-
mately 3 million pieces of mail daily. 
The regional processing center contains 29 high-speed
sorting machines. In contrast, the local post office, a two-room
structure with 48 employees, has no high-speed sorting
machines. All mail collected in the local post office is sent to
the regional processing center. The post office serves two zip
code areas; mail requiring sorting for the two zip codes is
hand-sorted at the local level by carrier route. 
The Connecticut Department of Public Health (CDPH), in
consultation with the Centers for Disease Control and Preven-
tion (CDC), recommended postexposure prophylaxis as a pre-
caution to protect the health of the postal workers in these
facilities (4). As part of a national distribution center sampling
protocol, an independent contractor working for the United
States Postal Service (USPS) took environmental samples on
November 11, but anthrax spores had not been isolated in the
regional distribution center.  The decision was made to offer
prophylaxis to postal workers pending the results of addi-
tional, more focused testing.
The first of many postexposure prophylaxis clinics was
held on November 21, 2001. Postal workers were given an ini-
tial 10-day course of ciprofloxacin unless contraindicated (5–
7). Nasal swabs were collected from the postal workers at the
first clinics to determine if contamination was present in the
facilities, rather than to diagnose or define individual exposure
(8). B. anthracis was not isolated from any of 485 nasal swabs
taken from postal workers. 
On November 21, 25, and 28 and December 2, increas-
ingly focused environmental sampling was performed of both
the regional distribution center and the local post office to
determine whether any contaminated mail had passed through
the facilities (9). Samples obtained on November 21 and 25
were negative; samples taken on November 28 and December
2 from four high-speed sorting machines in the regional distri-
bution center were positive. No contamination was identified
in the local post office. Based on the positive results, the
CDPH recommended that prophylaxis be extended for a full
course of 60 days for all postal workers in the regional facility.
Facility management conducted a progressive series of town
hall meetings to notify postal employees of the test results at
*Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA;
and †Connecticut Department of Public Health, Hartford, Connecticut,
USA
OBIOTERRORISM-RELATED ANTHRAX
1134 Emerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 8, No. 10, October 2002
the various facilities, as well as results of postal worker nasal
swabs. Although contaminated sorting machines were shut
down for machine-specific decontamination, the regional dis-
tribution facility remained open. 
Antimicrobial testing of the Connecticut patient’s isolates
confirmed the sensitivity of this B. anthracis strain to both
doxycycline and ciprofloxacin. For the continuation phase of
prophylaxis, doxycycline was offered as the primary antibiotic
unless contraindications existed or the workers specifically
requested to continue on ciprofloxacin.
On December 10, 2001, we conducted a survey to evaluate
postal workers’ adherence to postexposure prophylaxis and to
identify factors influencing their degree of adherence. This
article describes the findings of the study. 
Methods
Of the 1,122 postal workers at the regional distribution
center, we randomly selected 100 from the night and day
shifts. Five workers declined; five additional workers were
randomly selected and agreed to participate (refusal rate 5%).
CDC health officials interviewed the group of postal workers
using a standardized questionnaire to collect information on
demographics, adherence, side effects, and attitudes regarding
postexposure prophylaxis and exposure risk. Several charac-
teristics were examined for determinants of starting prophy-
laxis, including sex, race, and age, as well as whether the
postal worker worked on high-speed machinery or obtained an
influenza vaccine. For comparison, age was divided into quar-
tiles. The lowest quartile (age <37 years) was compared with
the top three quartiles, and the highest quartile (age >52) was
compared with the bottom three quartiles. Serious side effects
were defined as those causing death, hospitalization, persistent
or substantial disability, or birth defects, or requiring interven-
tion to avoid these outcomes (10). We conducted our analysis
using SAS software, version 8.2 (SAS Institute, Inc., Cary,
NC). 
Results
Of the 100 postal workers sampled, 66% were men. Mean
age was 45 years (range 19–65 years). Ethnicities reported
were Caucasian (71%), African-American (23%), Asian/
Pacific Islander (4%), and Hispanic (2%). None of the respon-
dents were pregnant. Fifteen employees worked on high-speed
sorting machines. Forty-two postal workers reported obtaining
an influenza vaccine during the previous 3 months.
Ninety-four of the 100 workers surveyed acquired antibiot-
ics from postexposure prophylaxis clinics sponsored by the
USPS; 6 workers did not attend the clinics. Of the 94 workers
who acquired prophylaxis, only 68 started the antibiotics to
prevent anthrax; therefore, of those surveyed, 32 postal work-
ers did not initiate prophylaxis. Postal workers were given
ciprofloxacin at initial prophylaxis clinics unless they reported
contraindications. Of the 68 postal workers starting antibiotics,
54 persons started ciprofloxacin, 12 doxycycline, and 2 other
antibiotics.
Characteristics of the persons who started prophylaxis ver-
sus those who did not are presented in Table 1. Male postal
workers were 1.5 times more likely to start prophylaxis than
female postal workers (relative risk [RR] 1.52; 95% confi-
dence interval [CI] 1.1 to 2.2; p<0.01).  Persons who reported
obtaining an influenza vaccine were more likely to start pos-
texposure prophylaxis (RR 1.26; 95% CI 1.0 to 1.6; p=0.07),
although this observation did not reach statistical significance.
Working on high-speed sorting machines, race, and age were
not predictors of starting prophylaxis. 
We asked the 32 postal workers who never started postex-
posure prophylaxis to identify all reasons for declining pro-
phylaxis (Table 2) and to indicate the single most important
reason. Nineteen (59%) workers stated that they did not feel
they were at personal risk for anthrax. Equal proportions of
postal workers (47%) cited negative nasal swabs of workers
and concerns about side effects as reasons for not starting pro-
phylaxis. Additional reasons included apprehension about
antibiotic resistance, waiting to see if personal exposure had
occurred, initial negative environmental samples, and fears
that prophylaxis would weaken immune systems. When postal
workers were asked to identify the single most important rea-
son for not starting postexposure prophylaxis, 25% of workers
reported not personally believing they were at risk for anthrax.
An additional 13% cited concerns about side effects as the
most important reason for not starting the regimen.
Adherence to Postexposure Prophylaxis
Adherence to the prophylaxis regimen was examined in
the 68 workers who started the prophylaxis. We grouped
adherence by an average of how many days the worker
reported being able to take antibiotic exactly as prescribed.
Thirty-one (46%) postal workers reported taking the prophy-
laxis regimen correctly every day; 23 (34%) took antibiotics
correctly 5–6 days per week; and 10 (15%) of workers took
antibiotics correctly <4 days per week. Adherence information
was not available for four postal workers. Of those starting
postexposure prophylaxis, 37 (54%) persons reported missing
doses.  The top two reasons workers cited for missing a dose
were forgetting to take the antibiotic (32%) and side effects
(15%). 
Table 1. Characteristics of postal workers starting postexposure pro-
phylaxis, Connecticut, 2001
Characteristic
No. of postal 
workers (n=100)
Relative 
risk
Confidence 
interval p value
Male 63 1.52 1.1 to 2.2 0.004
Influenza vaccine 42 1.26 1.0 to 1.6 0.07
High-speed 
machine
15 0.86 0.6 to 1.3 0.47
African-American 22 0.78 0.5 to 1.1 0.13
Age <37 years  22 0.98 0.7 to 1.4 0.92
Age >52 years 26 0.93 0.7 to 1.3 0.63Emerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 8, No. 10, October 2002 1135
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Reasons for Stopping Postexposure Prophylaxis
Twenty-one (31%) of 68 postal workers had discontinued
the prophylaxis regimen at the time of the survey. We asked
these workers to identify all reasons for discontinuation (Table
3) and to indicate the single most important reason why they
stopped. Over half (52%) of all who discontinued believed
they were not at personal risk or did not believe they had been
exposed to B. anthracis. Nine (43%) cited side effects as a rea-
son for stopping. Additional concerns were the initial negative
environmental findings and the negative nasal swabs. When
postal workers were asked to identify the single most impor-
tant reason for discontinuing prophylaxis, 33% of postal work-
ers reported experiencing side effects; 19% cited initial
negative environmental samples from the facility; and 19% did
not feel personally exposed. 
Side Effects
After susceptibility testing of isolates was confirmed,
postal workers were switched to doxycycline by USPS physi-
cians, unless that switch was contraindicated; of 47 workers
continuing antibiotics, 43 (91%) were switched to doxycycline
during the second round of prophylaxis clinics. Six (13%)
workers were switched because of side effects. At the time of
the survey, postal workers had taken each medication for
approximately the same number of days. 
Equal numbers of postal workers surveyed took at least
some ciprofloxacin (n=55) and some doxycycline (n=56).
Twenty-three (42%) postal workers experienced side effects
while taking ciprofloxacin, with 22% reporting multiple symp-
toms. Twenty-one (38%) postal workers experienced side
effects while taking doxycycline, with 21% reporting multiple
symptoms. Overall, 35 (51%) of those who began postexpo-
sure prophylaxis experienced symptoms while on antibiotics. 
Of side effects most frequently reported by postal workers
for both antibiotics, the most common were gastrointestinal
complaints (Table 4). Diarrhea and abdominal pain were
reported by 22% of workers on ciprofloxacin and 13% of
workers on doxycycline. Nausea and vomiting were reported
by 15% of the postal workers taking ciprofloxacin and 18%
taking doxycycline. Fatigue was cited by 9% of the postal
workers taking either drug. No significant differences between
the proportions of postal workers reporting side effects while
taking either medication were reported. No serious side effects
were noted.
Only four persons missed work secondary to side effects of
the prophylaxis (mean=1 day); only two physician visits for
side effects occurred. No hospitalizations were reported.  
Discussion
The findings of this study extend the data on adherence
with postexposure prophylaxis and substantiate other similar
surveys (11). Despite concerns about the safety of postal work-
ers with potential exposures to B. anthracis, our survey dem-
onstrates that many workers did not take adequate
prophylaxis. Adherence in this population was apparently
affected by a low perceived risk for anthrax and a concern
about side effects. Concern about side effects was present even
before postal workers started taking antibiotics; 47% of the 32
workers who never started prophylaxis cited concern about
side effects as a reason. Although many workers did experi-
ence side effects, the side effects they reported were not
severe. In addition, many postal workers had difficulty taking
their medications as prescribed, and they missed doses of pro-
phylaxis.
Two factors may have contributed to the low perceived
risk of inhalational anthrax among postal workers. First,
results from the first three efforts to collect samples at the
postal facilities and the nasal swabs taken at the onset of the
investigation were negative for anthrax spores. Second, postal,
medical, and union leaders providing information on environ-
mental sampling results and their interpretation at USPS town
meetings tried to put the risk in the perspective as explained to
them by the Department of Public Health. Overall, the data
suggested a possible, but not high, risk for inhalational
anthrax. Spores were likely introduced in mid-October before
the New Jersey and Washington D.C. regional distribution
centers that handled the contaminated Daschle and Leahy let-
ters closed down. Use of compressed air to clean sorting
machines, which might have caused aerosolization of spores,
had ceased by October 23, when a general USPS advisory
against it was circulated. Maximum risk of exposure to aero-
solized spores likely occurred during that time. By the time the
postexposure prophylaxis clinics began, 30–40 days had
passed since the maximum risk period without the occurrence
Table 2. Reasons for postal workers to decline postexposure prophy-
laxis regimen, Connecticut, 2001 
Response
No. of postal 
workers (n=32) %
Not at risk for anthrax  19 59
Concerned about side effects from 
the antibiotics
15 47
Nasal swabs were negative 15 47
Concerned about antibiotic resistance 14 44
Waiting to see if exposed  12 38
Negative environmental samples  12 38
Concerned about weakening immune 
system
10 31
Table 3. Reasons for discontinuing postexposure prophylaxis regi-
men, Connecticut, 2001
Response
No. of  postal 
workers (n=21) %
Not at risk for anthrax 11 52
Not exposed  11 52
Had side effects from the antibiotic  9 43
Nasal swabs were negative 7 33
Negative environmental samples  6 29BIOTERRORISM-RELATED ANTHRAX
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of any cases of inhalational anthrax in regional facility work-
ers. In addition, the initial samples taken on November 11 and
21, with methods that readily identified spores in New Jersey
and Washington, D.C., had failed to identify any spores. These
factors were discussed during town meetings in an effort to
reassure postal workers, while still emphasizing that a period
did occur when spores were in the air, especially around the
sorting machines.
In this setting, the numbers of postal workers who
accepted antibiotics could not be used as a measure for the
numbers of postal workers who actually took prophylaxis.
Anecdotally, many postal workers reported obtaining the anti-
biotics to “have on hand” in the event “I start to feel sick.” The
postexposure prophylaxis survey was critical in determining
the level of adherence and identifying issues affecting adher-
ence in this population.
The circumstances of this prophylaxis campaign, along
with the small sample size and potential for recall bias associ-
ated with this survey, limit the inferences that may be drawn.
For example, some misclassification of side effects as doxycy-
cline- or ciprofloxacin-related may have accompanied the
switch in medications. In addition, the study size limits any
speculation on reasons why our study found an association
between men and starting prophylaxis. Larger postexposure
prophylaxis surveys may identify the reason for this and other
associations that were not significant in our analysis. Nonethe-
less, the survey provided important information on adherence
to prophylaxis and reasons for nonadherence.
In the event of another bioterrorism attack, public health
officials must communicate, early and effectively, the need for
potentially exposed persons to initiate and continue postexpo-
sure prophylaxis. Specifically, officials should clearly commu-
nicate to at-risk persons the explanation that epidemiologic
tools such as nasal swabs are poor indicators of past personal
exposure and are, at best, indicators only of recent exposure.
While important, reassurance must be balanced with clear
explanations of risk. Of note in our study is the fact that the
one group deemed to be at higher risk—those working on
high-speed mail sorting machines—was found no more likely
to begin or continue on prophylaxis than persons working else-
where in the facility. 
Potentially exposed persons need to be aware that side
effects are to be expected, but that the vast majority of side
effects will be mild. Education should center on how to recog-
nize and minimize minor side effects while describing which
side effects require immediate medical assistance. Ameliora-
tion of side effects is essential if persons are to stay on their
regimens, especially if the time period is lengthy. In addition,
antibiotic reminder programs such as signs in common areas
or buddy systems may improve adherence to postexposure
prophylaxis.  
In conclusion, if public health officials deem initiating pro-
phylaxis programs necessary, conducting frequent follow-up
surveys to measure adherence and identify obstacles to pro-
phylaxis in a specific population will be important in identify-
ing perception problems and maximizing the benefits of
preventive therapy.  
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